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"BUT WHOEVER TREASURES FREEDOM . 
THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL AND 
EXTRATERRITORIAL ABORTIONSt 
Seth F. Kreimer* 
I. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
"· • • • 
My thinking on the subject of extraterritorial regulation of abor-
tions was sparked originally by two events that occurred about a year 
ago. The first was the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari1 in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 2 to address the question of whether Roe v. Wade 3 
remained the law of the land. At the time, the betting was that, with 
the substitutions of Justice Thomas for Justice Marshall and Justice 
Souter for Justice Brennan, the Court would answer "no"; abortion 
would be remitted entirely to the political process. The expected green 
light created the risk of a checkerboard of abortion rights, with some 
states dedicated to the total elimination of abortion and others equally 
committed to the protection of reproductive autonomy, either as a 
matter of statute or of state constitutional law. This result appeared 
likely to reinstate the pattern that existed in the years immediately 
before Roe, under which more than forty percent of abortions were 
performed for women outside of their home states. Women with re-
sources traveled from restrictive states to more liberal ones to obtain 
abortions. 
But the world has become more polarized on the abortion issue in 
the past twenty years. A system that might have been in equilibrium 
in 1971 seemed destined in 1992 to draw further efforts by anti-abor-
tion forces in restrictive states to prevent women from taking advan-
t Copyright© 1993 by Seth F. Kreimer. 
• Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1974, J.D. 1977, Yale. - Ed. A 
version of this article was delivered to the AALS Conflict of Laws Section at the AALS Conven-
tion in San Francisco in January 1993. My thanks to Gerry Neuman and Lea Brilmayer for their 
comments both in and out of that forum. 
The partial quotation in the title is from "Dona Dona," a song originally written for the 
Yiddish musical Esterke by Aaron Zeitlin in 1940. The relevant couplet in English translation is: 
"Calves are easily bound and slaughtered, never knowing the reason why, 
But whoever treasures freedom, like a swallow will learn to fly." 
1. 112 s. Ct. 931 (1992). 
2. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). As a matter of full disclosure, I should note that I was one of the 
members of the counsel team for the appellant clinics in Casey and remain involved in the litiga-
tion on remand. 
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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tage of the options available elsewhere. One straw in the wind was a 
second event, this one in Ireland, that occurred at about the same time 
the Court granted certiorari in Casey. Officials of Ireland, which by 
constitutional amendment prohibited abortion, sought an injunction to 
prevent a fourteen-year-old Irish rape victim from traveling to Eng-
land to terminate the pregnancy that resulted from the rape. 
Although the Irish Supreme Court ultimately reversed the injunction 
on the ground that the young woman's threats of suicide made her 
plight so severe as to permit an abortion within the strictures of Irish 
law,4 the opinions in the case did not <;Ieny the government's ability in 
future cases either to prevent travel to obtain abortions or to prosecute 
women once they had returned. This latter possibility was particu-
larly sobering in light of the West German practice, highlighted a year 
earlier, of engaging in forced gynecological searches at the Dutch bor-
der and prosecuting women who had avoided restrictive West German 
abortion laws by obtaining abortions in the Netherlands.5 The ques-
tion that seemed pressing at the time was whether restrictive Ameri-
can jurisdictions would be permitted to emulate officials in Ireland and 
Germany, either by seeking to prevent women from leaving the juris-
diction to obtain abortions, or by endeavoring to prosecute them upon 
their return. 
For many reasons, the beginning of 1993 looks substantially differ-
ent from the beginning of 1992. German unification has made the lib-
eral abortion regime of East Germany available to West German 
women, and a more permissive unified German abortion law seems to 
be in the cards. 6 Irish voters have amended the Irish constitution to 
4. Attorney Gen. v. X [1992] I.R.L.M. 401 (Ir. S.C. Mar. 5, 1992) (LEXIS, Ireland library, 
Cases file). 
5. See EUR. PARL. DEB. (3-403) 202-05 (Mar. 14, 1991) (debate on resolutions condemning 
compulsory gynecological examinations by German officials of returning German women at the 
Dutch-German border); id. at 203 (statement of Rep. Van Den Brink) (stating that over 6000 
German women have had abortions in the Netherlands); id. at 204 (statement of Rep. Kep-
pelhoff-Wiechert) (defending searches on the ground that officials "are required by the code of 
criminal procedure to investigate illegal abortions of this kind carried out abroad"); Nina Bern-
stein, Germany Still Divided on Abortion, NEWSDAY, Mar. 11, 1991, at 5, 13 (reporting an ac-
count of a German woman returning from the Netherlands who was forced to submit to a 
vaginal examination at a Catholic hospital near the border and was charged with having an 
illegal abortion; noting that German Interior Ministry acknowledges the practice; citing a study 
by the Max-Planck-Institut in Freiburg that found such "inquisition[s]" to be "standard prac-
tice"); Karen Y. Crabbs, The German Abortion Debate: Stumbling Block to Unity, 6 FLA. J. 
INTL. L. 213, 222-23 (1991) (describing prosecutions and searches). The European Parliament 
condemned the searches and resolved that "the internal borders of the [European] Community 
may not be used to threaten citizens with prosecution for activities that are perfectly legal in 
some Member States but not in others." Resolution on Compulsory Gynaecological Examina-
tions at the Dutch-German Border of Mar. 14, 1991, 1991 O.J. (C 106) 13. 
6. See Michael G. Mattern, Note, German Abortion Law: The Unwanted Child of Reunifica-
tion, 13 LoY. L.A. INTL. & CoMP. L.J. 643, 686 n.360 (1991). With reunification, the decision to 
retain East Germany's substantially more _permissive abortion law within the old East German 
March 1993] Right To Travel 909 
permit both travel to obtain extraterritorial abortions and the circula-
tion of information regarding such opportunities. 7 Most importantly, 
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court held by a five-to-
four margin that states may not impose "undue burdens" on the op-
portunities of women to obtain abortions, and it has recently denied 
certiorari in Ada v. Guam Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 8 
which invalidated Guam's effort to prohibit abortions. Thus, the spec-
ter of an immediate return to the days before Roe has been dispelled. 
But Casey did not fully reaffirm Roe. Absolute bans on abortion 
remain impermissible, but the Casey plurality nonetheless permitted 
limitations which in its view had neither the "purpose [nor the] effect 
of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an 
abortion of a nonviable fetus."9 On the record before them, the Jus-
tices in Casey upheld both Pennsylvania's twenty-four hour waiting 
period for all women and its parental consent requirement for women 
under eighteen seeking aportions. The Court has recently denied certi-
orari in Barnes, 10 which upheld Mississippi's twenty-four hour waiting 
requirement against facial challenge. In the absence of congressional 
action, we can expect a new generation of abortion statutes from anti-
abortion states that seek to impose limits as extreme as the Supreme 
Court's "undue burden" standard will permit. These limits will be 
juxtaposed with statutes and state constitutional protections in neigh-
boring states that affirmatively protect reproductive autonomy even 
more fully than Roe. 
borders provided the option of traveling to East Germany as well. Id. at 652 & n.47, 686. The 
new, liberalized uniform abortion law that the unified German legislature has adopted amelio-
rates the problem, although the law itself is being challenged in the German Constitutional 
Court. See Tamara Jones, Abortion Is Legalized in Germany, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 1992, at AlO. 
7. See, e.g., William Tuohy, Irish Reject A Move To Allow Abortions, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 28, 
1992, at AS (noting that an amendment regarding the substance of the abortion law was rejected 
at the same time that amendments permitting circulation of information regarding extraterrito-
rial abortions and the right to travel were accepted by lopsided margins); Ireland Rejects Abor-
tion Referendum Proposals, REUTER LIBR. REP., Nov. 28, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis 
Library, Intl. File (noting that the travel amendment was approved by 62.3% of voters and the 
information amendment was approved by 59.8%). The amendments read: 
Subsection 3 of this section shall not limit freedom to travel between the State and an-
other state. 
Subsection 3 of this section shall not limit freedom to obtain or make available, in the 
State, subject to such conditions as may be laid down by law, information relating to services 
lawfully available in another state. 
See Geraldine Kennedy, Attorney General Believes Abortion Legislation Will Still Be Necessary, 
IRISH TIMES, Oct. 12, 1992, at Al, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Intl. File. 
The European Human Rights Court has held that Irish efforts to prohibit dissemination of 
information about the availability of overseas abortions violate the European Human Rights 
Convention. 
8. 962 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 633 (1992). 
9. 112 S. Ct. at 2820. 
10. Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 656 (1992). 
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Pennsylvania's statute has yet to take effect, but in Mississippi 
abortion opponents have used the twenty-four hour waiting period as 
an opportunity to track down and harass women seeking abortions. 11 
As a result both of these efforts and of the delays and burdens of re-
quiring two trips to abortion clinics, abortions within Mississippi have 
fallen off by fifty percent.12 At least part of this reduction, however, 
reflects a displacement of the site of abortions to neighboring states 
without such waiting periods.13 Just as in the years before Roe, wo-
men in Mississippi appear to be making use of interstate travel to 
avoid burdensome regulations. Similarly, young women regularly 
travel out of their home states to avoid parental consent require-
ments.14 We can, I think, expect that zealous opponents of abortion 
will attempt to prevent such results. It is thus only a matter of time 
before American courts face the shadow of the issue before the voters 
of Ireland: may women seek to obtain abortions extraterritorially 
under circumstances that would be illegal at home?15 
The question initially is one of statutory construction, and often 
statutes will answer the question in the negative on their faces. Some 
provisions, like Pennsylvania's, appear by their own terms limited to 
abortions performed within the regulating state. 16 Others, like Ten-
11. See, e.g., William Booth, Mississippi's 24-Hour Countdown for Abortions, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 7, 1992, at Al, A6; Fawn Vrazo, A Preview of Limited Abortion, Phila. Inquirer, Sept. 14, 
1992, at Al. 
12. Booth, supra note 11, at A6; Alissa Rubin, The Abortion Wars Aren't Over, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 13, 1992, at C2; Vrazo, supra note 11. 
13. Rubin, supra note 12; David Snyder, Abortion Waiting Period Debated, NEW ORLEANS 
TIMBS PICAYUNE, Nov. 9, 1992, at Al, AS (reporting an increase in the number of women from 
Mississippi at abortion clinics in Shreveport and Memphis); Vrazo, supra note 11, at A6 (noting 
that abortion clinics in New Orleans and Memphis report a rise in Mississippi patients). 
14. E.g., Tamar Lewin, Parental Consent to Abortion: How Enforcement Can Vary, N.Y. 
TIMBS, May 2S, 1992, at Al, BS (noting that Indianapolis abortion clinics advise teenagers seek-
ing abortions without parental consent to go to neighboring Kentucky or Illinois and that one 
hundred teenagers a month have left Massachusetts to avoid parental consent requirement); In re 
Jane Doe, No. 6S,501, 1992 Kan. App. LEXIS 597, at *2-3 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug. 2S, 1992) 
(granting waiver of parental notification to unemancipated minor from out of state who sought 
abortion in Kansas). 
The effect is not a new one. Robert Mnookin concluded that a major effect of the imposition 
of a parental consent requirement in Massachusetts in 19S1 was that "many girls who formerly 
would have secured abortions in Massachusetts are now going to other states." ROBERT H. 
MNOOKIN, IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN 241-42 (19S5). 
15. Cf. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 792 & n.31 (1993) (Ste· 
vens, J., dissenting) (noting that "the right to enter another state for the purpose of seeking 
abortion services available there is protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause"; thus, if 
Roe dissent became the law, "diversity among the States in their regulation of abortion proce-
dures would magnify the importance of unimpeded access to out-of-state facilities"). 
16. Pennsylvania's 24-hour waiting period punishes "[a]ny physician who violates the provi-
sions of this section" or who "performs or induces an abortion without first obtaining the certifi-
cation required by subsection (a)(4) or with knowledge or reason to know that the informed 
consent of the woman has not been obtained." lS PA. CONS. STAT.§ 3205(c) (West Supp. 1992). 
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nessee's, contain no territorial limitations17 but are directly subject to 
general statutes that constrain state criminal jurisdiction to "offense[s] 
committed in this state."18 But Mississippi's statute falls into a third 
category: it subjects to criminal prosecution "[a]nyone who purpose-
fully, knowingly or recklessly performs ... an abortion" without com-
plying with statutory mandates. 19 When faced with such statutes, 
courts must decide whether either the traditional American presump-
tion against extraterritorial criminal prosecutions20 or constitutional 
Its parental consent requirement forbids a physician from providing an abortion in the absence of 
the specified parental consent. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3206(a) (West Supp. 1992). 
The Pennsylvania statute defines "physician" as "[a]ny person licensed to practice medicine 
in this Commonwealth." 18 PA. CoNs. STAT.§ 3203 (West Supp. 1992). Thus, abortion provid-
ers outside of Pennsylvania (at least if they are not licenced to practice within the state) are not 
bound by either the 24-hour period or the parental consent requirement. 
Section 3204 provides: "(a) .•. No abortion shall be performed except by a physician .... 
(d} Penalty. Any person who intentionally, knowingly or recklessly violates the provisions of this 
section commits a felony of the third degree ...• " However, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 102(a)(l) 
(1983) limits Pennsylvania's criminal jurisdiction to situations in which "the conduct which is an 
element of the offense or the result which is such an element occurs within th[e] Common-
wealth," except where the defining statute "expressly prohibits conduct outside th[e] Common-
wealth when the conduct bears a reasonable relation to a legitimate interest of th[e] 
Commonwealth ••.. " 18 PA. CoNST. STAT. § 102(a)(6) (1983). 
For referrals, § 102(a)(4) provides that Pennsylvania has criminal jurisdiction if "conduct 
occurring within th[e] Commonwealth establishes complicity in the commission of, or an at-
tempt, solicitation or conspiracy to commit, an offense in another jurisdiction which also is an 
offense under the law ofth[e] Commonwealth." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 102(a)(4) (1983) (empha-
sis added). Referrals to a state where the abortion is legal would not fall within this section since 
an abortion legal in the jurisdiction where it occurs would not be an "offense" in that 
jurisdiction. 
17. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-202 (1991) punishes as a felony failure by a physician to 
abide by a two-day waiting period for "[a]n abortion otherwise permitted by law." 
18. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 39-11-103 (1991); see Edge v. State, 99 s.w. 1098 (Tenn. 1907) 
(procuring abortion in sister state not indictable); cf. supra note 16 (citing Pennsylvania's general 
provisions regarding criminal jurisdiction); MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03(1) (Proposed Official 
Draft 1962): 
[A] person may be convicted under the law of this State ... if: 
(a) either the conduct that is an element of the offense or the result that is such an 
element occurs within this State; or ... 
(d) conduct occurring within the State establishes complicity in ... an offense in another 
jurisdiction that is also an offense under the law of this State; or .. . 
(f) a statute of this State ... expressly prohibits conduct outside the State, when the 
conduct bears a reasonable relation to a legitimate interest of this State .... 
The Model Penal Code has been adopted in 29 jurisdictions. § 103 cmt. 1. 
19. MISS. CoDE ANN. § 41-41-39 (Supp. 1992). This apparently general applicability may 
be limited by MISS. CoNST. art. III, § 26, which requires a criminal case to be tried before the 
jury of the county in which the crime occurred. See Mississippi Publishers Corp. v. Coleman, 
515 So. 2d 1163, 1165 (Miss. 1987) (en bane) (crime that occurred outside Mississippi could not 
be tried in Mississippi by a jury from the county where the crime occurred). 
20. For discussion of the traditional American maxim that criminal statutes have no extra-
territorial effect, see, for example, MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 cmt. 1 (Proposed Official Draft 
1962); B.J. George, Jr., Extraterritorial Application of Penal Legislation, 64 MICH. L. REv. 609, 
621-28, 631 (1966) (arguing that no federal constitutional barrier stands in the way of extraterri-
torial prosecutions, but acknowledging that state constitutional limits in 29 states would prevent 
wholly extraterritorial prosecutions); Larry Kramer, Comment, Jurisdiction Over Interstate Fel-
ony Murder, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 1431, 1433-39, 1448-51 (1983); Robert A. Leflar, Conflict of 
Laws: Choice of Law in Criminal Cases, 25 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 44, 50 (1974) ("Probably 
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limitations circumscribe their reach beyond state borders. The issues 
will be whether Mississippi can prosecute doctors in neighboring states 
who perform abortions on women from Mississippi without providing 
a twenty-four hour waiting period, and whether Mississippi can prose-
cute such women as accessories upon their return to the state. 
In a prior article,21 I addressed the problem of extraterritorial 
abortions under the assumption that the federal constitutional right of 
reproductive choice would be repudiated by the Supreme Court on 
Justice Scalia's theory that such rights lack sufficiently deep roots in 
the history and traditions surrounding the framing of the Constitution 
and the Fourteenth Amendment. I argued there that a constitutional 
methodology that relied on traditions and expectations of the Framers 
would provide a strong basis for concluding that the Constitution im-
poses severe limits on states' power to project their moralities extrater-
ritorially. 22 If Justice Scalia is serious about a regard for history and 
tradition, a right of American citizens to travel to more hospitable 
moral climates in other states is at least as solidly rooted as the power 
of states to prohibit abortions. The Framers both of the Constitution 
and of the Fourteenth Amendment wove into the fabric of the Consti-
tution the presumption that states' regulatory authority ended at their 
own boundaries. 
As it turns out, Justice Scalia did not prevail in Casey, and one 
cannot simply turn his methodology to the question of extraterritorial 
prosecutions. The conclusion that we should avoid such prosecutions 
is not, however, limited to a historically bound, originalist constitu-
tional approach. 
In this article, I undertake to examine the question further from a 
normative perspective. Assuming that courts do, or should, incorpo-
rate contemporary political insights into the legal structure, is the 
traditional presumption against extraterritorial prosecution in this 
context one that should, as a matter of political theory or practice, 
claim allegiance? I argue that, at least where American citizens seek 
to take advantage of locally legal abortion options in sister states, the 
home state should not be permitted to enforce its conflicting criminal 
forum state citizenship alone would be too little if the defendant citizen's act were done in a sister 
state ...• "); Rollin M. Perkins, The Territorial Principle in Criminal Law, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 
1155, 1164 (1971) (setting forth history of territorial principle in common law, and concluding 
that "no state may punish its citizen for what he does in the exclusive territorial jurisdiction of 
another state where what was done was lawful"); Daniel L. Rotenberg, Extraterritorial Legisla-
tive Jurisdiction and the State Criminal Law, 38 TEXAS L. REV. 763, 781 (1960) (skeptical of 
policy, but setting forth history of "shibboleth of territoriality"). 
21. Seth F. Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of Law: Abortion, the Right to Travel, 
and Extraterritorial Regulation in American Federalism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 451 {1992). 
22. Id. at 464-72. 
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statutes extraterritorially. My argument has two parts. First, I argue 
that concerns of constitutional structure support a territorial concep-
tion of state regulatory authority over state citizens' activities in sister 
states. Second, I maintain that the "duty of allegiance," which is 
sometimes thought to support such regulation, lacks support from the 
theories that generally underpin an obligation to obey the law. 
II. THE ARGUMENT FOR TERRITORIALISM 
Initially, the proposition that federal courts should limit a state's 
criminal or regulatory authority to actions within its own boundaries 
runs into the conventional wisdom of modern conflict of laws doctrine. 
Although the Supreme Court in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. 23 
(Aramco) articulated a presumption against extraterritoriality for fed-
eral statutes, Professor Larry Kramer has recently excoriated the 
Aramco court for adopting a "nineteenth century system" that func-
tions in a "senseless fashion."24 According to Kramer, "if anything is 
established" in modem conflict of laws thinking, "it is that across-the-
board territoriality is a poor system for resolving conflicts."25 To 
Kramer, Aramco is as "arbitrary" as a rule that American law would 
not apply when the events that give rise to the claim occurred on Mon-
day, Tuesday, or Wednesday.26 
I am not a conflicts scholar, but to me, a claim that the location of 
the acts at issue is as irrelevant to the exercise of state authority as the 
day on which they take place seems excessive when applied to Ameri-
can citizens' actions in sister states. Within the American constitu-
tional system, some persuasive things can be said for territoriality.27 
Unlike the international community, our polity is characterized by a 
23. 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991) (construing Title VII as not applying to employment discrimina-
tion outside of the borders of the United States). 
24. Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 1991 
SUP. Cr. REv. 179, 212, 223. 
25. Id. at 210-11. "The argument is simple: ... it may make sense to apply a law to acts 
outside the state whenever the fact that these acts occurred outside the state is irrelevant to 
achieving the law's domestic objective." Id. at 211. I am not sure whether Kramer is inserting 
an escape hatch with the adjective domestic. Elsewhere, he seems to indicate that the issue is 
simply what the "aim of a law" is. Id. 
26. Id. at 212. He does not, however, say that courts should always construe laws to apply 
extraterritorially, because "conflict with •.. the domestic law of another nation" may lead a 
court not to apply its own law. Id. at 211 n.123. 
27. Professor Douglas Laycock has said many of them recently at a more general level. See 
Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations 
of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 249 (1992). The present article presents a sketch of 
concerns rather than a full-blown system of resolving conflicts of laws. Likewise, I leave aside 
arguments based on concerns of comity for the interests of sister states of the sort Professor 
Brilmayer articulates. See Lea Brilmayer, Interstate Preemption: The Right To Travel, the Right 
To Life, and the Right To Die, 91 MICH. L. REV. 873 (1993). 
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single overriding national citizenship that entails the right of citizens 
to travel and migrate between states, an entitlement of citizens to the 
"privileges and immunities of citizens" in the states they visit, and a 
history of territorially defined community authority. 
A. The Right To Travel 
Even before the framing of the Constitution, Article IV of the Arti-
cles of Confederation explicitly protected the right of the people of 
each state to 'free ingress and regress to and from any other State."28 
Since the formation of the Union, the Constitution has likewise been 
thought to protect the "right of a citizen of one state to pass through, 
or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, pro-
fessional pursuits, or otherwise. "29 In the shadow of the challenge to 
the Union by state sovereignties during the Civil War, the Supreme 
Court in Crandall v. Nevada adopted the view that, 
[f]or all the great purposes for which the Federal government was 
formed, we are one people, with one common country. We are all citi-
zens of the United States; and, as members of the same community, must 
have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without inter-
ruption, as freely as in our own States. 30 
The right to travel has personal, as well as political value: it un-
derpins our sense of liberty. Being tied to a locale is the essence of 
28. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV (1777). Professor Bogen, in David Bogen, The 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. 31 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 794, 811-14 (1987), 
traces the right to "ingress and regress" back to the Magna Carta and intercolonial movement. 
The draft presented to the Continental Congress entitled inhabitants "going to reside in another 
State •.. to all the rights and priviledges of the natural born free Citizens of the State [of their 
destination]." 9 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 889 (Worthington 
C. Ford ed., 1907); Bogen, supra, at 818-20. The Congress broadened the Article to protect the 
"privileges and immunities" of all "free inhabitants" in foreign states, ARTICLES OF CONFEDER-
ATION art. IV (1777), not only those "going to reside." The right to travel as well as to emigrate 
has consistently been acknowledged since that time. See Kreimer, supra note 21, at 500-08. 
29. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 547, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230) (enumerating 
Article IV privileges and immunities); see United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 297-98 (1920) 
("Undoubtedly the rights of citizens of the States to reside peacefully in, and to have free ingress 
into and egress from, the several States [against both their own and other states] ••• fused ••• 
into one [by Art. IV, § 2]."); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1871) ("[T]he 
clause plainly and unmistakably secures and protects the right of a citizen of one State to pass 
into any other State of the Union for the purpose of engaging in lawful commerce, trade, or 
business without molestation .... "); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869) ("[The 
Privileges and Immunities Clause] gives [citizens of each state] the right of free ingress into other 
States, and egress from them .... "), overruled on other grounds by United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533 (1944). That this was the understanding among polit-
ical actors as well is demonstrated in Kreimer, supra note 21, at 501-07. 
30. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting), quoted in 
Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 48-49 (1868) (also noting that "the principles here laid 
down may be found more clearly stated in the dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice in those 
cases"). I have advanced elsewhere the strong reasons to believe that the Citizenship Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted with a specific intent to secure the right of interstate 
travel. Kreimer, supra note 21, at 505. 
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serfdom.31 The right to travel allows us to widen our horizons by ex-
panding the scope of our opportunities and insights. Travel also un-
dermines parochial conformity, a fact that cannot have escaped either 
the founders of a nation established by dissenters fleeing persecution or 
the heirs of the abolitionist provocateurs who framed the Fourteenth 
Amendment.32 The right to travel provides us with the ability to ex-
periment with modes of living other than those sanctioned at home 
and to return with the potentially transformative knowledge we have 
gained.33 
A system that allows states to truncate these experiments by al-
lowing travel but punishing its object has the effect of undercutting 
this liberty. If the only way to escape from the force of a state's laws is 
to move to another state, we can expect increasing moral homogeneity 
in the state, as the most passionate or mobile dissenters relocate to 
31. For accounts of how denials of freedom of movement have been used to perpetuate sub-
jection in various repressive regimes, see, e.g., ROBERT E. JOHNSON, PEASANT AND PROLETA-
RIAN 29-31 (1979) (serfs in Czarist Russia); Leon Boim, The Passport System in the U.S.S.R., 
with Special Reference to the Status of Jews, 2 REv. SOCIALIST L. 15 (1976) (internal passports in 
the Soviet Union); Sydney Kentridge, The Theories and Realities of the Protection of Human 
Rights Under South African Law, 56 TuL. L. REV. 227, 242-47 (1981) (South African laws 
restricting movement); Elizabeth S. Landis, South African Apartheid Legislation I: Fundamental 
Structure, 71 YALE L.J. 1, 43-52 (1961) (South African Urban Areas Act); Lucie E. White, To 
Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 WIS. L. REv. 699, 
707 & n.28 (South African Pass Laws); Maimon Schwarzschild, Variations on an Enigma: Law 
in Practice and Law on the Books in the USSR, 99 HARV. L. REv. 685, 690-91 (1986) {book 
review) (internal passports in the Soviet Union). 
The link between the right to travel and basic freedom was made clear in the aftermath of 
emancipation to framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 
1st Sess. 475 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull of Illinois, Chair of Judiciary Committee and 
draftsman of Civil Rights Act) ("[A] person who is a citizen in one State ... is entitled to .•. the 
right to travel, to go where he pleases .... [A] law that does not allow a colored person to go 
from one county to another is certainly a law in derogation of the rights of a freeman."); id. at 
941-42 (Sen. Trumbull objecting to pass system in Texas by which a freedman found at large 
without a pass is whipped). · 
32. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted amid 
references to the experience of Rep. Samuel Hoar of Massachusetts, a cause celebre at the time in 
abolitionist circles. In 1844, Representative Hoar arrived in South Carolina to challenge that 
state's laws forbidding the entry of black seamen. He was driven out of the state by threats of 
violence with the connivance of state authorities, a result widely viewed by congressional Repub-
licans as a violation of his rights as a national citizen. See Kreimer, supra note 21, at 506. 
Professor Amar has argued that the abolitionist heritage of the Fourteenth Amendment embod-
ies a particular concern with "cultural outsider[s] who[] ... challenged head on the social order 
and general orthodoxy." Akhil R. Amar, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term - Comment: The 
Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REv. 124, 152-53 
(1992); see also Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE 
L.J. 1193, 1272-74 (1992). 
33. Of course, not every exercise of the right to travel is a potentially transformative exercise 
of moral choice. The nature of the federal union protects the right to travel to avoid excise taxes 
as well as the right to travel to have abortions. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 92-96. The 
case of moral dissensus, however, presents particularly pressing reasons exist to regard extraterri-
torial regulation as problematic, both because of its tendency to impose parochial limitations and 
because of the moral force of other regimes. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 77-81. 
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other jurisdictions. The aspect of our tradition that values diversity 
and experimentation, both for their own sake and as bulwarks against 
tyranny, would see this homogenization as a substantial cost.34 
If citizens were presumed to be subject everywhere to the criminal 
laws of their home states, the price of travel within the United States 
would be subjection to a double dose of moral demands. Upon cross-
ing the border a state citizen would remain subject to the moral de-
mands of her home state while also taking up the demands of the state 
that she visits. With respect to most laws, the double demands are 
congruent; when I travel from Pennsylvania to California, if I am 
bound by both states' prohibitions against murder, robbery, and arson, 
my freedom of action is subject to little additional constraint. How-
ever, where the basic moral commitments of the states differ, a system 
that provides for the continuation of home state control will mean that 
interstate travel subjects the traveler to the restrictions of both re-
gimes. In a culture that values freedom, this is a cost; it is also a 
disincentive to interstate travel. In a nation whose citizenship entails a 
right to travel among the states, premised in part on the power of 
interstate travel to forge a single nation, such disincentives to inter-
state travel should be minimized. 
Neither legislative nor judicial action by the states is likely to miti-
gate the disincentive to travel that criminal prohibitions produce, as it 
might in the case of civil obligations. In a civil context the situs state 
might conceivably allow the visitor to be governed by her home state 
rules, whether more lenient or more restrictive. California might well 
decide for reasons of comity that, when I visit, the contracts I make 
with other Pennsylvanians should be governed by Pennsylvania law. 
In a criminal context, however, the state's obligation to maintain order 
within its boundaries precludes such an outcome. California would 
never allow me to assist another Pennsylvanian's suicide in violation of 
California law simply because similar conduct would be legal at home. 
But the problem is worse still. In the civil case, even if California 
declines to defer to Pennsylvania law, I can often at least fix my obli-
gations to a single standard, assuming that I can obtain jurisdiction 
over the individuals with whom I interact in California. Once I have a 
34. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 22 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairchild ed., 1981): 
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests compos· 
ing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be 
found of the same party . . . . Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties 
and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common 
motive to invade the rights of other citizens .... 
Just as extending the scope of the republic promotes a diversity of interests, which guards 
against tyrannical triumph of any single interest, structures which inhibit moral pluralism within 
a single state pose an increased danger of the triumph of faction. 
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California judgment of my civil obligations, the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause obligates Pennsylvania to abide by that judgment. By contrast, 
in the criminal case the prevailing dual sovereignty theory holds that a 
single series of actions may be separately punishable offenses under the 
criminal laws of two sovereigns, and hence that Pennsylvania would 
be fully within its rights in punishing me even if California has acquit-
ted me.35 
B. Equal Privileges and Immunities 
The United States is not a league of separate sovereigns; it is a 
single nation. This fact has implications beyond the right to travel. 
One of the means of establishing national unity embedded in our Con-
stitution has been the entitlement of citizens of individual states to 
interact with one another as equal members of a common nation. 
When I enter California, I do so as an American citizen, not as a 
Pennsylvanian; I show no passport at the border, and I am subject to 
no special disabilities upon my entrance. 36 This is not a matter of 
grace, like the lenient treatment I receive when entering Canada. 
Rather, it is my right as a citizen of the United States to be treated 
with the same respect shown to native Californians. The status of citi-
zenship in American states has from the formation of the Constitution 
"entitled" citizens to this treatment by virtue of the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause of Article IV of the Constitution. 37 When American 
citizens travel "in the several states," as is their right, they are "enti-
tled" to the privileges and immunities of local citizens. 38 
35. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985). Heath upheld Alabama's effort to punish a kid-
napping-murder that began in Alabama and ended in Georgia, despite the fact that Georgia had 
already prosecuted and exacted punishment for the crime. Justice O'Connor's "dual sovereignty 
analysis" recognized Alabama's "interest in vindicating its sovereign authority," 474 U.S. at 93, 
although Georgia had already punished the crime. 
Heath, however, does not contemplate punishment for wholly extraterritorial actions. Ala-
bama's "sovereign interest" arose by virtue of the crime's commencement in Alabama, not by 
virtue of the defendant's Alabama citizenship. 474 U.S. at 93. Indeed, the defendant would not 
have been convicted if the defense had succeeded in its argument that the kidnapping did not in 
fact begin in Alabama. See 474 U.S. at 85. 
I have argued elsewhere that an effort to criminalize the mere departure to obtain an abortion 
would be an impermissible interference with the right to travel. See Kreimer, supra note 21, at 
508 n.194. 
36. Cf., e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (invalidating California statute 
which prohibited assisting the immigration of indigents); Green v. Anderson, No. Civ. S-92-
2118, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 802, at *16 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 1993) (invalidating California's 
lower welfare payments for recent immigrants). 
37. U.S. CoNsr. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
38. Mark P. Gergen, The Selfish State and the Market, 66 TExAs L. REv. 1097, 1118-28 
(1988), maintains that Article IV is concerned only with economic rights. This seems to me a 
misreading of the history and construction of the clause. As I see it, his interpretation faces three 
difficulties. 
First, Article IV of the Articles of Confederation contained two sets of protections: the right 
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As the modem Court has articulated it, "the primary purpose of 
[the Privileges and Immunities Clause] ... was to help fuse into one 
Nation a collection of independent, sovereign States. It was designed 
to insure to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same 
privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy."39 Historically, the goal 
was not simply to avoid interstate friction but to further a sense of 
national unity among the individual citizens who comprised the "peo-
ple" of the Republic.40 Thus, home states cannot waive the Article IV 
of "free inhabitants of each of these States .•. to all the privileges and immunities of free citizens 
in the several States," and the right of"the people of each State ••. [to] enjoy [in other states] all 
the privileges of trade and commerce." ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV (1777). The 
broader language, without the commerce limitation, is what the Constitution adopted. The text 
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause has no limitation of the sort that Gergen suggests. 
Second, precedent does not reflect such a limitation. Several cases over the years have re-
ferred to privileges and immunities of a noncommercial nature. Justice Washington in Corfleld 
v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230), includes the right of habeas 
corpus. Several early cases include access to the courts. E.g., Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 
256 (1898). United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 293 (1921), seems to include the right to 
reside. Most recently, Justice O'Connor in Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 73-81 (1982) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring), relies on the clause as a ground for striking down the Alaska oil 
bonus to all citizens. Moreover, as I demonstrate in Kreimer, supra note 21, during the antebel-
lum period both the political and judicial branches seemed to think that Article IV included a 
right to interstate travel and migration for any purpose. Id. at 501-06. 
Third, while in Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commn., 436 U.S. 371 (1978), Justice Blackmun 
refers to the protected activities as those "basic to the livelihood of the Nation,'' he also refers to 
those that are "basic to the maintenance or well-being of the Union,'' 436 U.S. at 388, those that 
are "basic and essential," 436 U.S. at 387, and those "bearing upon the vitality of the Nation as a 
single entity." 436 U.S. at 383. More directly on point, Justice Powell in Supreme Court ofN.H. 
v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 281 n.11 (1985), expressly rejects a claim that only commercial activities 
are protected, commenting that "[t]he Court has never held that the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause protects only economic interests" and citing Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (protect-
ing the right of out-of-state residents to obtain abortions). 
The other technical objection to the privileges-and-immunities theory is that the clause is 
often said to apply only against foreign states, and not against home states. I address this objec-
tion in Kreimer, supra note 21, at 514-19. 
39. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948). This passage is quoted with approval in 
Zobel, 457 U.S. at 74 (O'Connor, J., concurring); United Bldg. & Constr. Trades v. Mayor of 
Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 216 (1984); Piper, 470 U.S. at 279-80; and Supreme Court of Va. v. 
Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 64 (1988). 
40. The Court set the course for future interpretation in articulating Article IV's role in the 
federal system with the memory of the struggle for Union raw in the national consciousness. 
It was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to place the citizens of each State 
upon the same footing with citizens of other States, so far as the advantages resulting from 
citizenship in those States are concerned. It relieves them from the disabilities of alienage in 
other States; ... it insures to them in other States the same freedom possessed by the citizens 
of those States .... It has been justly said that no provision in the Constitution has tended so 
strongly to constitute the citizens of the United States one people as this. 
Indeed, without some provision of the kind removing from the citizens of each State the 
disabilities of alienage in the other States ... the Republic would have constituted little more 
than a league of States; it would not have constituted the Union which now exists. 
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869) (emphasis added; footnote omitted). This 
passage was quoted with approval in Friedman, 487 U.S. at 64; Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 
524 (1978); Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commn., 436 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1978); United States v. 
Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 295 (1920); and Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 78 
(1920). 
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rights of their citizens when the states regard those rights as unneces- . 
sary to guard against interstate friction;41 rather, the citizens as indi-
viduals are "entitled" to local privileges and immunities when they 
visit neighboring states. As citizens from different states travel and 
interact on a basis of equality, they develop and maintain conscious-
ness of themselves as equals and members of a single polity. 
By contrast, a system in which µiy opportunities upon entering 
California remain subject to the moral demands of Pennsylvania un-
dercuts this sense of national unity. Such a system would deny to me, 
because of my status as Pennsylvanian, the privileges that the Califor-
nians I pass on the street share as their birthright. This situation 
hardly advances the goal of establishing a single national identity. 
One might, of course, claim that, in remaining subject to Penn-
sylvania law, I achieve equality of a different sort with the Californi-
ans: we are each equally bound by the law of our home state. 42 This 
claim encounters three difficulties. First, in the criminal context, the 
premise that each citizen will be equally subject to the laws of her 
home state is inaccurate. No state is willing to give me the full benefits 
of the law of my home state. While the Californians I pass on the 
street are not bound by the law of Pennsylvania, California's obliga-
tion to keep order within its own boundaries will not allow it to grant 
me an exemption from local criminal law on the ground that I am 
bound by the law of Pennsylvania.43 Thus, in the criminal context, a 
41. In Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 668 (1975), New Hampshire sought to de-
flect an attack under the Privileges and Immunities Clause on the ground that the home state 
could remove New Hampshire's discriminatory tax on nonresidents' income by imposing its own 
taxes. The court held that under the Privileges and Immunities Clause "the constitutionality of 
one State's statutes affecting nonresidents [cannot] depend upon the present configuration of the 
statutes of another State." Thus, the status of the home state's antiabortion policy would not 
dilute the entitlement of out-of-state visitors to obtain abortions on a basis of equality with do-
mestic residents. See also Travis, 252 U.S. at 82 ("A State may not barter away the right, con-
ferred upon its citizens by the Constitution of the United States, to enjoy the privileges and 
immunities of citizens when they go into other States."), quoted in Austin, 420 U.S. at 667 (ap-
proving the Travis reasoning). 
42. Cf. BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED EssAYS ON THE CoNFLICT OF LAWS 505-06, 572 
(1963) (discussing problems with the position that a nonresident's rights are everywhere deter-
mined by the law of her home state); John H. Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in 
Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & MARYL. REv. 173, 190, 211 (1981) (flirting with the proposition 
that "the apparent central purpose of the Privileges and Immunities Clause is served so Jong as 
everyone is accorded the benefits of his or her home state's Jaw"). 
43. The example of Somalia suggests that Hobbes was at least partially right: the bare mini-
mum obligation of government is to enforce norms that protect life and liberty within its own 
boundaries. In theory, a state might enforce different norms against locals and visitors within the 
state. However, if criminal Jaw imports moral condemnation, for a state to permit morally 
blameworthy activities within its jurisdiction simply on the basis of the citizenship of the protag-
onists would be, to say the least, odd. 
In practice, such an abdication of local norms would deny locals interacting with foreigners 
the protection that their home state has determined to be morally required. No state does this, 
nor could one. Moreover, the requirement of a jury trial in criminal cases renders such a pros-
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"personal law" regime will inevitably put the visitor at a disadvantage 
compared to the native. 44 
Second, the equality that the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
seeks to foster is one that affirmatively advances national unity, not 
one that simply avoids invidious discrimination against individual citi-
zens. The "entitlement" of Article IV is constitutive of the nation as 
well as protective of the individual. The equality of a "personal law" 
regime emphasizes the differences between individuals as citizens of 
different states rather than their commonalities. It undercuts rather 
than fosters common national citizenship. 
The third difficulty recognizes that the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause not only fosters national unity and inhibits parochial discrimi-
nation, but also imparts to individual American citizens the freedom 
that accompanies national citizenship. The predecessor of the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause in Article IV of the Articles of Confeder-
ation explicitly protected the "right of ingress and regress," and the 
Framers both of the Constitution and of the Fourteenth Amendment 
clearly understood the Privileges and Immunities Clause to recognize 
similar rights. 45 One of the reasons for interstate travel was the desire 
to take advantage of local opportunities in other states. A system of 
personal law that empowered the home state to permit travel but to 
deny its object would undercut this liberty of movement just as surely 
as would a refusal on the part of the host state to allow newcomers to 
take advantage of the local laws. Indeed, the ability of a home state to 
forbid its citizens to take advantage of opportunities legal in other 
states would impinge on the other heritage of Article IV of the Arti-
cles of Confederation: the right under the Commerce Clause to take 
pect anomalous in the extreme. The concept that a jury, selected to represent the "community's 
conscience," would apply a norm rooted in the conscience of another community is self-contra· 
dictory. Nor could a state avoid the problem by remitting offenders for trial to their home states. 
Relying on the government of the sister state to enforce order within the state is entirely at odds 
with the American Constitution: when the local government requires outside help to control 
domestic violence, thefederal government is responsible for providing it. See U.S. CoNsr. art. 
IV, §4. 
44. This is, of course, a general criticism of Brainerd Currie's "interest analysis" of conflicts. 
See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Territorial Discrimination, Equal Protection, and Se/f-Determina· 
tion, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 261, 320-24 (1987) ("[D]enying [nonresident defendants] the benefits of 
forum law puts them at an unfair disadvantage."); Lea Brilmayer, Shaping and Sharing in Demo-
cratic Theory: Towards a Political Philosophy of Interstate Equality, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. R.Ev. 389, 
413 (1987) (arguing that Curriean choice of law is discriminatory because the "outsider bears all 
of the burdens oflocal law, but is not entitled to its application when that would be beneficial") 
[hereinafter Brilmayer, Shaping and Sharing]; Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of 
Legislative Intent, 18 MICH. L. REv. 392, 416-17 (1980) (arguing that interest analysis "seems 
directly contrary to the spirit of the privileges and immunities clause and the equal protection 
clause") [hereinafter Brilmayer, Interest Analysis]. 
45. Kreimer, supra note 21, at 500-06. 
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advantage of the national market of goods and services offered within 
the " 'area of trade free from interference by the States.' "46 
C. The Nature of the Union 
In the international arena, nations have occasionally claimed the 
right to control the extraterritorial actions of their citizens. British 
impressment of American seamen on the basis of claims about the in-
dissoluble bonds of allegiance of former British subjects was one of the 
precipitating factors of the War of 1812. American thinking extended 
jurisdiction based both on claims of allegiance47 and on "the uniform 
practice of civilized governments for centuries to provide consular 
tribunals in other than Christian countries . . . for the trial of their 
own subjects or citizens for offences committed in those countries."48 
The tradition of allowing the states that constitute our nation to 
exercise control over the conduct of their citizens in sister states is 
much more tenuous. State courts from the founding of the Republic 
through the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment denied the power 
of states to prosecute for wholly extraterritorial acts, and a majority of 
46. American Trucking Assns. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 280 (1987) (quoting Boston Stock 
Exch. v. State Tax Commn., 429 U.S. 318, 328 (1977)); see Dennis v. Higgins, 111 S. Ct. 865, 871 
(1991) ("Commerce Clause ... confer[s] a 'right' to engage in interstate trade free from restric-
tive state regulation."); H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949) ("Our system, 
fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged 
to produce by the certainty that he will have free access to every market in the Nation ... [and] 
every consumer may look to the free competition from every producing area in the Nation to 
protect him from exploitation by any."). 
A modem strain of Commerce Clause doctrine prohibits efforts by states to regulate extrater-
ritorial commerce directly. In Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324 (1989), a majority of the Court 
relied on Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), for the proposition that "the 'Commerce 
Clause . . . precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly 
outside of the State's borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the State.'" 491 
U.S. at 336 (quoting MITE, 457 U.S. at 642-4J); see also 491 U.S. at 336 n.13 ("[A]ny attempt 
'directly' to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over persons or property would ••• exceed the 
inherent limits of the State's power.") (quoting MITE, 457 U.S. at 643 (quoting Shaffer v. Heit-
ner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977))); 491 U.S. at 333 n.9 (MITE "significantly illuminates the con-
tours of the constitutional prohibition on extraterritorial legislation"). The Healy Court 
invalidated Connecticut's efforts to link the price of beer that interstate brewers sold within Con-
necticut to the prices that those brewers charged in neighboring states. See Kreimer, supra note 
21, at 493-94. 
47. See Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 733 (1952) (because territorial definition of 
treason was rejected by the Constitutional Convention, the Court "reject[s] the suggestion that 
an American citizen living beyond the territorial limits of the United States may not commit 
treason against them" and notes that "[o]ne who has a dual nationality will be subject to claims 
from both nations, claims which at times may be competing or conflicting," giving taxes and 
military service as examples); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932) (affirming the 
obligation of expatriate American citizen to return and testify in court). For recent discussion of 
American exercise of nationality jurisdiction in the international arena, see, for example, Lea 
Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1217 (1992); Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome": Multinational Misconduct and 
the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 598 (1990). 
48. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 462 (1891). 
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states today have state constitutional requirements that constrain 
criminal prosecutions of wholly extraterritorial offenses.49 The Model 
Penal Code presumes in most circumstances that criminal jurisdiction 
must be predicated on the occurrence of conduct or direct and in-
tended consequences within the prosecuting state. so 
The American Constitution acknowledges exclusive state sover-
eignty over conduct within the territories defined by state borders. 
Many aspects of the constitutional structure would make no sense 
otherwise. The understanding that a citizen of one state who ventured 
into another state would be bound by the local law was the premise for 
the adoption of Article IV's Privileges and Immunities Clause; the 
clause was necessary to guarantee that the host would not use its ex-
clusive power to the detriment of visitors from other states in the 
Union. The Extradition Clause of Article IV provides that an accused 
who flees from the state where a crime is committed must be "deliv-
ered up to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime"; 
it acknowledges that the sole responsibility and prerogative for punish-
ment rests with the state within which the crime occurred.st 
The Constitution affords federal guarantees for the territorial in-
49. I use the term wholly extraterritorial advisedly. The Court has generally recognized, at 
least since the beginning of this century, that states are entitled to punish " '[a]cts done outside a 
jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it.' " Ford v. 
United States, 273 U.S. 593, 620 (1927) (quoting Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911)); 
see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03(l)(a) ("result occurs in the state"). 
For discussion of state court practice for the first hundred years of the Republic, see Kreimer, 
supra note 21, at 464-72. State vicinage provisions that effectively limit the ability to prosecute 
wholly extraterritorial crimes exist in at least 29 jurisdictions. See George, supra note 20, at 631; 
cf John J. Murphy, Revising Domestic Extradition Law, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1063, 1081 (1983) 
(counting 35 such provisions). 
50. MODEL PENAL CoDE § 1.03 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); see id. cmt. 1: 
So long as sovereignties are spatially defined, their reciprocal interests imply, at least in 
general, a limitation of their regulatory goals to influencing what occurs within their bor-
ders. Such a limitation ... yields some safeguard against the unfair condemnation of con-
duct that is approved or tolerated by the community in which the acts involved occurred. 
The exceptions provided by the Model Penal Code are § 1.03(l)(e) (omission of a perform-
ance of a legal duty with respect to some person or thing within the state) and § 1.03(1)(f) ("a 
statute of this State that expressly prohibits conduct outside the State, when the conduct bears a 
reasonable relation to a legitimate interest of this State."). 
Twenty-nine states have adopted versions of the Model Penal Code. § 1.03 cmt. 1. Of these, 
only 12 have adopted the "express exception" provision. Id. cmt. 6. 
51. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2; cf Letter of James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Mar. 
10, 1784), reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 517 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph 
Lerner eds., 1987) ("Unless Citizens of one State transgressing within the pale of another be 
given up to be punished by the latter, they cannot be punished at all . . • .''). Madison was 
discussing the demand by South Carolina that Virginia extradite a Virginia citizen for an assault 
in South Carolina. His assumption was that Virginia would have no authority to punish its 
citizens for extraterritorial wrongs. 
Professor Laycock argues forcefully that, as a matter of constitutional law, "[s]tate authority 
is in fact divided territorially .... State boundaries do what ordinary citizens think they do: 
divide the authority of separate sovereigns.'' Laycock, supra note 27, at 320. As well as relying 
on political thought of the Framers and their opponents, he observes that the prohibition in Art. 
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tegrity of the states against encroachment by their neighbors, against 
invasion, and, upon their request, against "domestic Violence."52 In 
the absence of such a request, responsibility for ensuring "domestic 
tranquility" rests with the state within whose territory the allegedly 
wrongful act or consequence occurs. 53 Indeed, the combination of 
power and responsibility for ensuring order within their territories 
provides the firmest basis for the states' claims to obedience to their 
laws. Where this responsibility is absent, the authority to demand 
obedience is correspondingly diminished. Unlike the United States' 
diplomatic responsibility to provide for my protection when I visit 
Mexico, Pennsylvania has no similar responsibility - or capacity -
to ensure my protection, whether by direct intervention or by threat of 
war, when I visit California. When I enter California, I pass into the 
care of California, guaranteed to me by the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause. 
The understanding of the scope of legitimate criminal jurisdiction 
is further illuminated by the colonial claim that British efforts to 
"depriv[e] us in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury" and 
"transport[] us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended o:ffenses"54 con-
stituted grounds for revolution. 55 The guaranty of a jury local to the 
IV, § 3, cl. 1 against forming new states "within the Jurisdiction of any other State" equates 
jurisdiction with territory. Id. at 317. 
52. U.S. CoNST. art. IV, §§ 3, 4. 
53. Cf. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 137 (1959) (relying on the "historic right and obliga-
tion of the States to maintain peace and order within their confines"), quoted in Heath v. Ala-
bama, 474 U.S. 82, 93 (1986). 
54. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 20-21 (U.S. 1776); see also Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 152 (1968). 
55. At common law, a crime could be prosecuted only before a jury from the county in which 
the crime occurred. See William W. Blume, The Place of Trial of Criminal Cases: Constitutional 
Vicinage and Venue, 43 MICH. L. R.Ev. 59, 64-65 (1944); Drew L. Kershen, Vicinage, 29 OKLA. 
L. R.Ev. 801 (1976). British threats in 1769 to extradite colonials from Massachusetts for trial in 
England drew immediate and unanimous outrage from colonial legislatures as "highly deroga-
tory of the rights of British subjects; as thereby the inestimable Privilege of being tried by a Jury 
from the Vicinage ... will be taken away .... " JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES OF 
VIRGINIA 1766-1769, at 214 (John Pendleton Kennedy ed., 1906); see also Blume, supra, at 64; 
Kershen, supra. In 1774 the Continental Congress asserted the "great and inestimable privilege 
of being tried by their peers of the vicinage" and claimed that the British practice of indicting "in 
any shire or county within the realm" deprived Americans of "a constitutional trial by jury of the 
vicinage." CONTINENTAL CoNGRESS, DECLARATION AND RESOLVES (Oct. 14, 1774), reprinted 
in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 51, at 258. 
According to Madison, the "uniformity of trial by Juries of the vicinage" among the states 
was what made extradition under the Articles of Confederation to the place where the crime 
occurred palatable: 
The transportation to G[reat] B[ritain] seems to have been reprobated on very different 
grounds: it would have deprived the accused of the privilege of trial by jury of the vicinage 
••. and have exposed him to trial in a place where he was not even alleged to have ever 
made himself obnoxious to it .... 
Letter of James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Mar. 10, 1784), reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS' 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 51, at 517. 
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site of the alleged crime was embodied in Article Ill's requirement 
that for federal offenses "[t]he Trial of all Crimes ... shall be held in 
the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed."56 In an 
era when· '~uries rather than judges spoke the last word on law en-
forcement because the juries possessed power to determine all issues of 
law or fact that came before them/'57 the guaranty of a jury of the 
vicinage in criminal cases included in the Sixth Amendment58 was 
clearly in its origins what it is only implicitly today: not only a proce-
dural protection but a choice of law provision protecting citizens 
against extraterritorial control. 
III. THE ARGUMENT FROM ALLEGIANCE 
The proponents of a personal abortion law that women carry with 
them upon leaving their home states need not rest on the claim that 
territorial law is arbitrary. Even if reasons exist to limit state regula-
tory authority to its own boundaries, countervailing considerations 
may apply when the state seeks to regulate the actions of its own citi-
zens extraterritorially.59 
A state with a restrictive twenty-four hour waiting period, such as 
Mississippi, could defend such regulation on the ground that a citizen 
of Mississippi, by virtue of her citizenship, owes a duty of obedience to 
Mississippi's laws even outside its boundaries. Mississippi could point 
to the holding in Blackmer v. United States 60 that an American citizen 
abroad "continued to owe allegiance to the United States," and "[b]y 
56. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. Article III also provides for cases in which the federal 
crime is committed outside of state territory. This may either simply indicate that the Framers 
contemplated that the United States would hold sovereignty over territory not within any state, 
or that the nation, unlike the states, could expect to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
57. William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth Century Constitution as a Basis for Protecting Liberty, 
in WILLIAM E. NELSON & ROBERT C. PALMER, LIBERTY AND COMMUNITY: CONSTITUTION 
AND RIGHTS IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 15, 19 (1987). Nelson continues: 
The absence of armies, police forces, and bureaucracies and the ultimate power of juries 
over the substance of the law reveals much about the governance of eighteenth-century 
America. Colonial governments were unable to impose law on recalcitrant minorities by 
force; they had to govern through law that was acceptable to the broad base of white, male, 
landowning, and taxpaying citizens from whom jurors were randomly drawn. 
Id. 
58. Anti-Federalist fears "that Article Ill's provision failed to preserve the common-law 
right to be tried by a 'jury of the vicinage' ... furnished part of the impetus for introducing 
amendments to the Constitution that ultimately resulted in the jury trial provisions of the Sixth 
and Seventh Amendments." Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 93-94 (1970). The Sixth Amend· 
ment guarantees that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
59. Although to my knowledge no state has made the women who obtain abortions in viola· 
· tion of its restrictions directly liable, potential liability could arise from a woman's status as 
coconspirator or accessory. 
60. 284 U.S. 421 (1932). 
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virtue of the obligations of citizenship, ... he was bound by its laws 
made applicable to him in a foreign country."61 Quoting Skiriotes v. 
Florida, 62 Mississippi could maintain that, 
[i]f the United States may control the conduct of its citizens upon the 
high seas, we see no reason why the State ... may not likewise govern 
the conduct of its citizens . . . . Save for the powers committed by the 
Constitution to the Union, the State . . . has retained the status of a 
sovereign. 63 
Moreover, relying on Professor Korn, it could claim the sanction of 
the 
social contract, whereby one assents to cast his lot with others in ac-
cepting the burdens as well as the benefits of identification with a partic-
ular community, and ... cedes to its lawmaking agencies the· authority 
to make judgments ... striking the balance between his private substan-
tive interests and competing ones of other members of the community. 64 
Such arguments, however, would rest on a concept of state citizen-
ship that is not borne out by the cases from which the quotations are 
taken, and a concept of the duty to obey the home state law that does 
not follow from the usual philosophical defenses of the duty of alle-
giance. At the level of case law, Blackmer is a case involving federal, 
not state, power; furthermore, it endorsed the canon of statutory con-
struction by which "legislation of the Congress, unless the contrary 
intent appears, is construed to apply only within the territorial juris-
diction of the United States."65 Skiriotes is specifically limited to state 
prosecution of crimes "within no other territorial jurisdiction."66 In 
the abortion area, the Supreme Court's opinion in Bigelow v. Virginia 
was premised on the proposition that Virginia could not constitution-
ally regulate abortions performed in New York.67 
61. 284 U.S. at 436. 
62. 313 U.S. 69 (1941). 
63. 313 U.S. at 77. 
64. Harold L. Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 CoLUM. L. REV. 772, 
799 (1983). Professor Brilmayer has been prolific in advancing the concept that application of 
law must be justified by a political theory of obligation. See, e.g., LEA BRILM!> YER, JUSTIFYING 
INTERNATIONAL Acrs (1989) [hereinafter BRILMAYER, JUSTIFYING INTERNATIONAL Acrs]; 
Brilmayer, Shaping and Sharing, supra note 44; Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness and Choice of 
Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277, 1294 (1989) ("Choice oflaw rights arise out of the fact that the state's 
legitimate authority is finite and the state ought to recognize this. A state is entitled to coerce 
because it has satisfied the standards of political legitimacy that define the situations in which 
state coercion is proper.") (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness and Choice 
of Law]. She has been somewhat skeptical that any of the relevant theories justify coercion. See 
BRJLMAYER, JUSTIFYING INTERNATIONAL Acrs, supra, at 52-78; Lea Brilmayer, Consent, Con-
tact and Territory, 74 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1989). 
65. Blackmer, 284 U.S. at 437. 
66. 313 U.S. at 78; see 313 U.S. at 77 (high seas). 
67. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). Bigelow reversed the conviction of a Virginia newspaper for adver-
tising abortion referral services in New York. The seven-member majority stated that the Vir-
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With respect to the duty of allegiance, the argument passes far too 
quickly from the fact of citizenship to the duty of extraterritorial obe-
dience. In fact, the major plausible theories that support a duty of 
obedience to the law as normatively desirable either equivocate with 
regard to extraterritorial enforcement68 or suggest that in our system 
such extraterritorial duties are themselves unjustified. 69 
A. Consent and Its Cousins 
1. Actual and Tacit Consent 
The progenitor of the claim that a "social contract" obligates citi-
zens to obey the laws of their polity is, of course, John Locke. Begin-
ning with the proposition that nothing can put a person "into 
ginia legislature "obviously could not have proscribed the activity" in New York, and could not 
have prosecuted its residents for traveling to New York and obtaining the services because "Vir-
ginia possessed no authority to regulate the services provided in New York." 421 U.S. at 823-24. 
It will not do to say that this aspect of Bigelow was dictum. In Posadas de Puerto Rico 
Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 345 (1986), Justice Rehnquist distinguished Bigelow from 
a limitation on advertising for domestic gambling on the ground that, in Bigelow "the underlying 
conduct that was the subject of the advertising restrictions was constitutionally protected and 
could not be prohibited by the State." 
As the Bigelow Court observed, the underlying for-profit referral services at issue in Bigelow 
were subsequently declared illegal by New York and were not themselves constitutionally pro-
tected against domestic regulation. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 822 n.8, 827. The only "constitutional 
protection" that distinguishes Bigelow is the protection against extraterritorial regulation of con-
duct legal where it occurs. Cf. Nielson v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315 (1909): 
Where an act is ma/um in se prohibited and punishable by the laws of both States, the one 
first acquiring jurisdiction of the person may prosecute ..• [but where] the opinion of the 
legislatures of the two States is different •.. the one State cannot enforce its opinion against 
that of the other, at least as to an act done within the limits of that other state. 
212 U.S. at 320-21. 
Justice Rehnquist, of course, dissented from Bigelow, calling its territorial limitation unjusti-
fied and "at war with our prior cases," 421 U.S. at 835 n.2, and in all probability he stands ready 
to reverse Bigelow on the merits. Cf. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609-11 (1991) (Rehn-
quist, C.J.) (stare decisis is less compelling in constitutional than in statutory cases). It is always 
possible that, if faced with extraterritorial limitations that it regards as "reasonable,'' a Supreme 
Court majority will repent of the regard for stare decisis manifested by the plurality in Planned 
Par~nthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
68. The equivocal implications of the usual theories come as no surprise to political scien-
tists. E.g .. ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRmcs (1989): 
Although claims about the domain and scope of authority clearly rest on value judg-
ments of some kind, what immediately strikes the eye when we examine specific claims is 
how much a reasonable solution will necessarily depend on concrete circumstances .••• 
Once again one might well wonder whether the problem admits of a general solution or 
indeed whether general principles can have any bearing at all on feasible solutions. 
Id. at 195. 
69. This leaves aside the possibility, adopted for example by MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORAL-
ITY, POLITICS, AND LAW 105-14 (1988) and A. JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND 
PoLmCAL OBLIGATIONS (1979), that there is no prima facie obligation to obey law as such. 
Obviously, if a state cannot morally demand obedience to its law, outside of the moral merits of 
the law itself, in morally contested areas of conflict of laws, the fact of allegiance imports no 
obligation. 
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subjection to any earthly power but only his own consent,"70 Locke 
asserted an obligation to obey grounded alternatively on express con-
sent and tacit consent. One who "has once by actual agreement and 
any express declaration given his consent to be of any commonweal is 
perpetually and indispensably obliged to be and remain unalterably a 
subject to it."71 In addition, 
every man that hath any possession or enjoyment of any part of the do-
minions of any government doth thereby give his tacit consent, and is as 
far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government during such 
enjoyment as any one under it; whether this his possession be of land to 
him and his heirs for ever, or a lodging only for a week; or whether it be 
barely travelling freely on the highway; and in effect it reaches as far as 
the very being of any one within the territories of that government. 72 
Locke's intellectual heirs widely concede that little in contempo-
rary society resembles an express consent to obey perpetually all of the 
laws of the states in which we live. 73 Lacking express undertakings, 
the Lockean argument must rest on tacit consent. However, as doubt-
ers since Hume have pointed out, residence or enjoyment of local ben-
efits is a weak basis on which to rest a claim of tacit consent, at least if 
tacit consent is understood as voluntary acquiescence. In the first 
place, the nature of the obligations consented to must be understood 
by the party who consents. If I am right that the tradition of 
America's system has been that the right to impose criminal punish-
ment is territorially limited, then the consent of residents in a system 
of universal justice is consent only to that territorially limited 
sovereignty. 74 
70. JOHN LoCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT ~ 119, at 60 (J.W. 
Gough ed., 1947) (6th ed. 1764). 
71. Id. ~ 121, at 61. 
72. Id. ~ 119, at 60; cf. PLATO, CRITO, at *5ld-e ("[I]fany one of you stand his ground when 
he can see how we administer justice ... we hold that by doing so he has in fact undertaken to do 
anything that we tell him."). 
73. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, CoNFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 69-70 (1987); 
GEORGE KLOSKO, THE PRINCIPLE OF FAIRNESS AND PoLmCAL OBLIGATION 142-43 (1992); 
SIMMONS, supra note 69, at 79-80 ("The paucity of express consentors is painfully apparent."). 
In addition to the lack of express undertakings, the American concept of citizenship diverges 
substantially from Locke's. Founded as it is on emigration from other countries, the United 
States has long taken the position that the right to alter one's status by expatriation is an "inher-
ent and fundamental right." JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITI-
ZENSHIP, 1608-1870, at 267-70 (1978); PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CmZENSHIP 
WITHOUT CONSENT 54-57 (1985) (discussing in particular the impressment controversy). 
The clarification of citizenship in the aftermath of the Civil War brought an explicit recogni-
tion by Congress in 1868 that "the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all 
people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." 
KETTNER, supra, at 344; SCHUCK & SMITH, supra, at 62. The establishment by the Fourteenth 
Amendment of a national rule that ascribed state citizenship to residence in a state embodied this 
conclusion in our fundamental law. 
74. Hume goes one step further, arguing that 
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In the second place, the voluntariness of such tacit consent is al-
ways at issue. When an impoverished woman in Mississippi declines 
the opportunity to escape Mississippi citizenship by abandoning her 
family, friends, community, and job, does she thereby "voluntarily" 
consent to application of Mississippi's law, or does she only bow to 
necessity? As Hume initially put the objection, "[w]e may as well as-
sert that a man, by remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the domin-
ion of the master, though he was carried on board while asleep, and 
must leap into the ocean and perish the moment he leaves her."75 Ter-
ritorially limited obligations have at least a marginal advantage on this 
score. If one can leave the state reasonably easily to do the forbidden 
act, and then return, the claim that by failing to leave one has con-
sented to the application of the prohibition gains at least some force.76 
implied consent can only have place where a man imagines that the matter depends on his 
choice. But where he thinks - as all mankind do who are born under established govern-
ments - that by his birth he owes allegiance to a certain prince or certain form of govern-
ment, it would be absurd to infer a consent or choice, which he expressly in this case 
renounces and disclaims. 
DAVID HUME, Of The Original Contract, in HUME'S MORAL AND PoLmCAL PHILOSOPHY 356, 
363 (Henry Aiken ed., 1948). In the United States, the fact that state citizenship legally follows 
residency means that most Americans believe. that they have a choice as to their state citizenship. 
Hume's argument is thus inapplicable in its pure form to state citizenship. 
75. Id. For some later versions, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 192-93 (1986) 
("[N]o one can argue that very long with a straight face. Consent cannot be binding on people, 
in the way this argument requires, unless it is given more freely, and with more genuine alternate 
choice, than just by declining to build a life from nothing under a foreign flag."); RUTH W. 
GRANT, JOHN LocKE's LIBERALISM 126 (1987) ("There is a general dilemma in the effort to 
specify what constitutes consent. If the criteria are 'strong' ••• consent theory is likely to be 
morally satisfying but practically problematic .... If the criteria are 'weak' ••• consent theory 
provides a practical criterion .•. but one that blunts the point of [Locke's moral] claim ••• ,"); 
GREENAWALT, supra note 73, at 73 ("People stay in homelands because of language, culture, 
job, friends, and family; their inertia hardly indicates approval or acceptance of government and 
laws.") (footnote omitted); DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRmQUE OF CONSENT THEORY 
183 (1989) ("Skeptical objections come fast and furious, only some of them with a nod to 
Hume .... Maybe [residence] signifies apathy; maybe it signifies lack of alternatives •••• Subjec-
tion to the government, much as I dislike ... it, might be something I'm grudgingly willing to 
put up with as the onerous price tag attached to staying.") [hereinafter HERZOG, HAPPY 
SLAVES]; DON HERZOG, WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS: JUSTIFICATION IN PoLmCAL THEORY 80 
(1985) ("Talk of consent immediately invites cynical sneers • • • : suitably stretched and 
redescribed with loving philosophical care, anything we do can count as consent.") [hereinafter 
HERZOG, WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS]; KLosKO, supra note 73, at 143 ("If consent is reduced to 
residence, or even to one's mere presence in a country, then voluntary consent has lost its 
point."); CAROLE PATEMAN, THE PROBLEM OF PoLmCAL OBLIGATION: A CRITIQUE OF LIB-
ERAL 'l;'HEORY 72-73 (1985); JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 80-94 (1986); SIM· 
MONS, supra note 69, at 99 ("The problem is that it is precisely the most valuable 'possessions' a 
man has that are often tied necessarily to his country of residence and cannot be taken from it."). 
BRILMAYER, JUSTIFYING INTERNATIONAL ACTS, supra note 64, at 62, argues that any residual 
force in the tacit consent from residency argument is parasitic on an undefended assumption that 
states indeed have legitimate power within their own boundaries. 
76. Whether women really have live options to exit to obtain abortions will depend on their 
life circumstances. Before Roe v. Wade, the poorest, youngest, least informed, most dependent, 
and most vulnerable women were least likely to find travel a live option. See, e.g., Carole Joffe, 
Physician Provision of Abortion Before Roe v. Wade, 9 REs. Soc. HEALTH CARE 21, 28-30 (1991) 
(finding abortions before Roe more available to women with resources or contacts; poor, young 
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2. Hypothetical Consent and Just Institutions 
A first alternative gloss on Locke suggests that the consent at issue 
is not the constrained or unconstrained actions of actual individuals, 
but the hypothetical consent of the original contract entered into by 
the founders of the commonwealth. If a government meets the terms 
of such a legitimate original contract, it has a claim to obedience.77 
Joseph Raz has recently written that, "if there is a common theme to 
liberal political theorizing on authority it is that the legitimacy of au-
thority rests on the duty to support and uphold just institutions."78 In 
the case of extraterritorial abortion, however, this duty is indetermi-
nate. First, the obligation to '_'support" just institutions does not carry 
any necessary implications as to the geographical scope of the duty. 79 
It is entirely consistent with the proposition that, as long as I do not 
actively seek to undermine the just institutions of my home state - as 
by committing treason or shooting a cannon into its territory or dis-
charging noxious fumes across its border - my obligation to "sup-
and minority women disproportionately vulnerable); James D. Shelton et al., Abortion Utiliza-
tion: Does Travel Distance Matter?, 8 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 260, 262 (1976) (noting negative cor-
relation between abortion rates and distance from abortion facilities strongest for black 
teenagers). Survey data in Steven Polgar & Ellen S. Fried, The Bad Old Days: Clandestine 
Abortions Among the Poor in New York City Before Liberalization of the Abortion Law, 8 FAM. 
PLAN. PERSP. 125, 126 (1976), suggest that, at least among the women of child bearing age in 
surveyed poverty areas, only 4% knew of a physician who could provide an abortion. Of those 
who sought to terminate pregnancies, only 2% used doctors; 80% attempted to terminate the 
pregnancy themselves. We have every reason to believe that the differential availability of the 
option of travel is equally great today. 
77. Hanna Pitkin, Obligation and Consent L 59 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 990, 995 (1965). A 
similar approach underlies the claims of JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 353-54 (1971): 
Because the "constitutional convention" in the original position would generate a constitution 
involving majority rule bound by basic principles of justice, "[b]eing required to support a just 
constitution, we must go along with one of its essential principles, that of majority rule. In a 
state of near justice, then, we normally have a duty to comply with unjust laws in virtue of our 
duty to support a just constitution." 
Rawls concludes that, in the original 'position, the problem of free riding would lead the 
participants to exclude the possibility of conscientious objection. It is, however, far from clear 
that a territorial limitation would similarly be discarded, at least where the exit in question is an 
exit to other reasonably just states. Unless most of American history is at odds with "essential 
principles," the original position would hardly yield personal rather than territorial jurisdiction 
as element of the duty to obey. Indeed, from a risk-averse original position, there is much to be 
said for a rule under which a potential minority with strongly felt views is entitled to exercise 
those views if it can persuade any of a number of reasonably just societies that the exercise is 
acceptable, rather than allowing a single state to veto the possibility entirely. 
78. Joseph Raz, Authority and Justification, in AUTHORITY 138 (Joseph Raz ed., 1990); see 
DWORKIN, supra note 75, at 193; GREENAWALT, supra note 73, at 162-68; HERZOG, HAPPY 
SLAVES, supra note 75, at 206 ("The root intuition [is] ... if the state is legitimate, we want to 
uphold it, and a presumption that the law ought to be obeyed is one way of doing that."); 
RAWLS, supra note 77, at 333-62; SIMMONS, supra note 69. 
79. Indeed, as a number of commentators have pointed out, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 75, at 
193, it implies nothing about any particular duty of citizens to support their home institution. 
"[I]t does not show why Britons have any special duty to support the institutions of Britain." 
Id.; see also SIMMONS, supra note 69, at 155-56. 
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port" my home institution is liquidated by my obedience to its laws 
within its boundaries and my payment of taxes while I reside there. 
Second, assuming that we treat both states as "just institutions," when 
a woman travels from Mississippi to California, this theory imposes 
upon her a duty to "support" California as well. When California tells 
her that abortions are a constitutional right, she owes deference to its 
"just judgments" as well as those of her home. The theory of just 
institutions provides no obvious way to decide which judgment is 
correct. 
The basis for the claims of obedience to law that has recently been 
articulated by Professor Raz himself suffers from a similar ambiguity. 
According to Raz, the obligation of citizens to obey government is 
based on the "practical authority" of the government, i.e., its ability to 
resolve moral conflicts more accurately than any individual citizen 
can. 80 However weak or strong that obligation may be in most cases, 
it dissolves in the circumstance where two state governments, both of 
which can claim similar "practical authority," come to different con-
clusions about the morality of a practice. While the limited moral ca-
pacities of the citizen or the usefulness of mediating principles in 
generating a pluralistic culture may oblige her to follow the rules of 
one state or the other, Raz's formula gives no reason to follow the 
rules of the home state rather than those of the situs state with which 
they conflict. 81 
Indeed, Raz's analysis cuts against an extraterritorial personal law 
regime. Where all states agree that a practice is to be condemned, 
their very unanimity is a sign of their practical authority in this mat-
ter. Moral dissensus undercuts the claim that one state or the other 
has the right moral answer. A territorial conception of obligation al-
lows a citizen who can travel to opt for the state that better accords 
with her· own moral insight and thus allows her to combine the 
strength of her insight with that of the government. 
3. Fairness, Bene.fits and Mutual Obligation 
Locke's argument about allegiance has been reformulated in a sec-
ond alternative fashion. The benefits of residence may obligate citi-
zens to the government not because they consent but because, as a 
matter of "fair play," accepting the benefits of an institution binds the 
80. See RAz, supra note 75, at 40-55, 78-80; Raz, supra note 78, at 129. 
81. Cf. Raz, supra note 78, at 133 ("One recurring kind of reason against accepting the 
authority of one person or institution is that there is another person or institution with a better 
claim to be recognized as an authority."). 
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participants to accepting its reasonable burdens as well. 82 The modem 
locus classicus of the argument is John Rawls: 
The main idea is that when a number of persons engage in a mutually 
advantageous cooperative venture according to rules, and thus restrict 
their liberty in ways necessary to yield advantages for all, those who 
have submitted to these restrictions have a right to a similar acquies-
cence on the part of those who have benefited from their submission. We 
are not to gain from the cooperative labors of others without doing our 
fair share. 83 
As support for a theory of extraterritorial obligations, the "fair 
play" theory is at best equivocal. It binds each participant or benefici-
ary in an ongoing enterprise to do her part in maintaining the institu-
tion by carrying out the duties imposed by that institution in the same 
way that others are bound. It does not, however, speak initially to the 
range of that uniform obligation. In a state that seeks to control all of 
its citizens extraterritorially, each of the citizens is bound to obey that 
state while abroad. On the other hand, in a state where the common 
commitment is to obey the state within its borders and not to seek to 
undermine it while abroad, the obligation of each to follow the laws of 
her home state is limited to actions within the state's borders. If I am 
right that the American tradition has run against the imposition of 
extraterritorial criminal liability, then the argument from fairness pro-
vides only limited support for imposing such liability initially. 
The fairness argument, indeed, cuts against a selective imposition 
of extraterritorial liability. 84 The argument is premised on a belief that 
each citizen is bound to do her part in the same way that others do. In 
a situation where most citizens are free to pursue their aims extraterri-
torially in accordance with the laws of the state they visit, a system 
that seeks to control only a small group of extraterritorial activities 
has substantially less claim to obedience as a matter of fairness. The 
few citizens who seek to pursue the extraterritorially forbidden activi-
ties can claim that they are not being asked to sacrifice in the same 
way as others but in a different and more onerous fashion. 85 
82. A. John Simmons makes this connection between Locke and the "fair play" theorists. 
SIMMONS, supra note 69, at 94. 
83. RA wrs, supra note 77, at 112 (footnote omitted). For Rawls' other canonical statement, 
see John Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY: A 
SYMPOSIUM (Sidney Hook ed., 1964) (In the case of a mutually beneficial scheme with the possi-
bility of free riding, "a person who has accepted the benefits of the scheme is bound by a duty of 
fair play to do his part and not to take advantage of the free benefits by not cooperating with 
it."). Rawls elaborated on the insight of H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 44 PHIL. 
REV. 175 (1955). 
84. This would be particularly relevant in Model Penal Code states that sought to take ad-
vantage of§ 1.03(1)(t). See supra note 18. 
85. Cf. GREENAWALT, supra note 73, at 142-44, 147-48 (stating that a distribution of bur-
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The fairness argument, moreover, rests most firmly on a duty aris-
ing out of a fair relation between benefits and burdens. 86 By joining a 
group of colleagues going out to lunch together, I may obligate myself 
to pick up my share of the check. I do not thereby bind myself to pay 
a share of their children's college tuition. 
Commentators frequently object to the duty of fairness on the 
ground that the claim that receipt of benefits imposes any obligation is 
unpersuasive when an individual did not seek the benefits and would 
reject them if given the chance. 87 This objection, however, is subject 
to the Hobbesian rejoinder that few individuals, with the example of 
Somalia fresh in their consciousness, can plausibly claim that they 
would reject the assurance of personal security that comes with a sys-
tem of functioning government. The uncontroversial and pervasive 
benefit on which duty-of-fair-play theorists can rely to ground a duty 
of general obedience to law is protection against the violence and dis-
order that arise in the absence of a system of justice. 88 Thus, a recent 
dens that is unfairly onerous to some undercuts the duty of fair play to bear those burdens: 
"Citizens have a fair play duty only to do as much as their fellows"); PA TEMAN, supra note 75, at 
122-24; RAWLS, supra note 77, at 355 ("Roughly speaking, in the long run the burden of injus-
tice should be more or less evenly distributed over different groups in society, and the hardship of 
unjust policies shollld not weigh too heavily in any particular case. Therefore the duty to comply 
is problematic for permanent minorities that have suffered from injustice for many years."). But 
see K!.OSKO, supra note 73, at 63-80 (arguing that as long as distribution can be supported by 
reasoned argument, and is the result of a "tolerably fair" decision procedure, it must be accepted 
as fair); id. at 34 ("The moral basis of the principle of fairness- is the mutuality of restrictions."). 
86. The premise of the "fair play" duty is that "the cooperation [of submitting to rules] ••• is 
required to produce the benefits." KI.osKo, supra note 73, at 34; cf. RAWLS, supra note 77, at 
112 (arguing that when some people "restrict their liberty in ways necessary to yield advantages 
for all, those who have submitted to these restrictions have a right to a similar acquiescence on 
the part of those who have benefited from their submission."). 
87. E.g., DWORKIN, supra note 75, at 194; ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTO-
PIA 93-95 (1974); SIMMONS, supra note 69, at 126-34. 
88. At some points, Brilmayer seems to suggest that the obligation of a citizen to obey the 
laws of her state is grounded in the citizen's right to vote in local elections. Brilmayer, Rights, 
Fairness and Choice of Law, supra note 64, at 1293 (for locals, sacrifice of rights for the common 
good can rely on "product of political processes in which the individual has participated"); id. at 
1298 ("[S]ome basis for obligation must be found. In the purely domestic arena, we seem content 
to point to the right to participate in political processes."). 
While this approach might generate a nexus with all the laws of the state, it will not satisfac-
torily describe a general system of political obligations, for it would suggest that minors, con-
victed felons, visitors from out of state, and corporations have no obligation to obey local law. It 
might also exempt those who do not vote. Cf. HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES, supra note 75, at 213. 
This connection is overinclusive and normatively undefended. When I, as a Pennsylvania resi-
dent, send a contribution to a candidate for governor of California, I am participating in the 
state's political process, which is my right under the First Amendment. Am I thereby consenting 
to be bound by the laws that the victorious candidate signs? 
Professor Herzog may provide the missing support. In HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES, supra note 
75, at 213, he argues that Locke's "root idea" should be conceptualized as being that "political 
obligation flows from government's being responsive to the people" as a whole. See also id. at 
205 ("[R]esponsive states are legitimate, and their citizens have an obligation to obey."). The 
right to vote undergirds political obligation, according to his theory, by guaranteeing responsive-
ness. However, Herzog recognizes that "the ability of ordinary people successfully to resist and 
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defender of the duty of fairness observed that "[t]he presumptive good 
that govemni.ents most clearly supply is physical security or protec-
tion. If X protects A from enemies, potential and real, then a strong 
presumption of obligation is established."89 
The benefit of physical security is primarily territorially generated; 
it comes from the mutual obedience to laws within the confines of the 
state. Pennsylvania does not, and cannot, guarantee my safety when I 
visit San Francisco; California does and can. When others obey Penn-
sylvania's law within Pennsylvania, when they comply with prohibi-
tions that protect against adverse impacts within Pennsylvania, or 
when they pay their fair share of Pennsylvania's costs of maintainirig 
order, I, as a Pennsylvania resident, benefit from this obedience in a 
way that is hard to disavow. I can be said to owe a reciprocal duty. In 
contrast, while I am in California and obedience to Pennsylvania law 
affects only events within California's borders, such obedience is cu-
mulative of the protection that California provides. I have not asked 
for and might disavow Pennsylvania's extraterritorial protection, and 
the extraterritorial obedience of other traveling Pennsylvanians pro-
vides me with no additional protection. Thus, Pennsylvania's claim in 
fairness that I repay the benefits of her protection is limited and secon-
dary when I visit San Francisco; California's fairness claims are pri-
mary. A state cannot claim universal obedience on the basis of. 
territorially limited benefits. 
The Supreme Court's doctrine in the area of taxation reflects the 
concept that there must be a fair relation between the benefits which 
the state provides and the obligations it seeks to impose. That doc-
combat government policy," for example in riots, is also a guarantor of responsiveness, id. at 204, 
and hence of legitimacy. 
Limiting a state to territorial boundaries provides an additional mechanism for "ordinary 
people successfully to resist and combat government policy": they may take advantage of oppor-
tunities offered in neighboring states. Allowing each individual to decline to obey any law she 
thinks objectionable would yield chaos. Cf HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES, supra note 75, at 202 ("If 
people disagree about policy, ... it's inconceivable that all their views be followed."). Allowing 
exit to other states on particular issues, however, permits citizens to opt into another ordered 
system. 
Elsewhere Brilmayer seems to rest on a broader notion that benefits can generate a claim of 
political obligation. Brilmayer, Interest Analysis, supra note 44, at 411; Brilmayer, Rights, Fair-
ness and Choice of Law, supra note 64, at 1293 (suggesting that one might rely on maximization 
of the total good of society in that each person who is a member of the society gets a share that is 
more generous); id. at 1304 ("Another attempt to explain territoriality might focus on the bene-
fits that an individual receives upon initiating purposeful contact with the state."). 
89. KLOSKO, supra note 73, at 113; cf SIMMONS, supra note 69, at 122 ("The benefits which 
citizens receive within the cooperative scheme of a political community may be thought of pri-
marily as the benefits of the rule of law."). DWORKIN, supra note 75, at 194, argues that this 
approach "justifies too much," that a Hobbesian argument must yield a Hobbesian conclusion. 
But the proposition that provision of personal security is a necessary condition for obligation 
does not imply that it is a sufficient condition. The "fair play" duty only imposes an obligation to 
do one's "fair share," which prevents it from toppling off the Hobbesian cliff. 
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trine casts doubt on the claim that a state may regulate all the extra-
territorial activities of a person domiciled within the state. In the tax 
cases, due process requires both a " 'minimum connection[] between a 
state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax' " and a 
"'relat[ion] to "values connected with the taxing State."' " 90 With 
respect to corporations, "there must be a connection to the activity 
itself, rather than a connection only to the actor the State seeks to 
tax."91 Precisely that connection to the activity of obtaining an extra-
territorial abortion is lacking in the cases we are considering. 
For a natural person, a state may tax the income of out-of-state 
activities, on the theory that a natural person owes a reasonable degree 
of support to the state she inhabits in exchange for the protection that 
makes the receipt of income possible.92 The obligation to pay a fair 
share of the costs of government, however, does not speak to an obli-
gation to obey state policy. The tax on income is an assessment based 
on what the state regards as the ability to pay, related to the ultimate 
receipt of income within the jurisdiction,93 not an effort to control the 
extraterritorial actions of the resident. The wealth of domestic corpo-
rations is not localized in the same fashion as natural persons, but 
rather consists of a network of interactions, and under the Due Pro-
cess Clause, the state may tax only income proportional to those inter-
actions that take place within the district. For those actions of natural 
persons, a ·similar concept suggests that the state may only tax or con-
trol activities within the taxing jurisdiction. 
Thus, although a state may impose an income tax on its residents' 
extraterritorial income, on the theory that the increment to the wealth 
of the resident ultimately takes place within the home jurisdiction, it 
cannot impose extraterritorial excise, inheritance, or use taxes, which 
attach to particular extraterritorial activities or tangible property.94 
90. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1909-10 (1992) (quoting Miller Bros. Co. 
v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954), and Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 
(1978)); see also Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 112 S. Ct. 2251, 2258 (1992); 
Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1982); ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State 
Tax Commn., 458 U.S. 307, 326-28 (1982); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 
425, 436-37 (1980); Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 219-20 (1980). 
91. Allied Signal, 112 S. Ct at 2258; see also ASARCO, 458 U.S. at 346 (1982) (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting) (under Due Process Clause, "[a]s with a nondomiciliary State, a domiciliary State 
may tax investment income only if it confers benefits on or affords protection to the investment 
activity"). 
92. See New York ex rel Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 313 (1937); Lawrence v. State Tax 
Commn., 286 U.S. 276, 281 (1932); Seth Goldstein, Note, "Resident" Taxpayers: Internal Con-
sistency, Due Process and State Income Taxation, 91 CoLUM. L. RE.v. 119, 129 (1991). 
93. See 300 U.S. at 312-13. 
94. Cf. American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S. 451, 458 (1965) (excise tax); Miller Bros. Co. v. 
Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954) (use tax); Treichler v. Wisconsin, 338 U.S. 251 (1949) (inheri-
tance tax on tangible property); Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925) (same). 
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States must impose use taxes on property used within the jurisdiction, 
because they are barred from collecting sales taxes on extraterritorial 
purchases by their residents. 95 Extraterritorial regulation is more like 
an excise or sales tax than an income tax. 9 6 
B. Community and Necessity 
1. Community 
Ronald Dworkin has argued recently that the conventional liberal 
accounts sketched above are all unpersuasive and that the source of 
the obligation to obey legal commands lies in the "special responsibili-
ties social practice attaches to membership in some biological or social 
group .... We have a duty to honor our responsibilities under social 
practices that define groups and attach special responsibilities to mem-
bership .... " 97 Such a justification for obedience to the laws gener-
ated by the states of which we are members, however, has two 
limitations when applied to the problem of extraterritorial abortions. 
First, if we define the obligation in terms of ongoing social practices, 
then the fact that, from its founding, our particu1ar political commu-
nity has denied the power of states to prosecute extraterritorially un-
dercuts the claim that the "social practice" of state citizenship imports 
a duty to obey my own state's obligations extraterritorially. After 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, state citizenship, unlike na-
tional citizenship, cannot be denied to any American citizen who seeks 
to reside within the state. The astonishment with which most Ameri-
can citizens who are not conflicts scholars would greet the assertion 
that the legality of their actions in California is governed by the laws 
of Pennsylvania hardly supports the claim that our "social practice" 
entails extraterritorial state jurisdiction. 98 The norm directing that ju-
ries, which are to embody the "conscience of the community" in crim-
inal cases, are to be drawn from the state in which the crime occurs 
95. See Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 586 (1937); National Geographic Secy. 
v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 555 (1977) (point of use taxes limited to in-state 
consumption is "to avoid problems of due process that might arise from the extension of the sales 
tax to interstate commerce."). 
96. A similar insight informs the requirement under the Commerce Clause that the tax be 
"applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [be] fairly apportioned ... 
and [be] fairly related to the services provided by the State." Complete Auto Transit,, Inc. v. 
Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977); cf. D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24 (1988) (hold-
ing that use taxation of domiciliary corporation's activities must meet the Complete Auto Body 
test). 
97. DWORKIN, supra note 75, at 196, 198; see also Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 
CAL. L. REV. 479 (1989). Brilmayer sketched a similar theory of obligation in Lea Brilmayer, 
Liberalism, Community, and State Borders, 41 DUKE L.J. 1, 11 (1991). 
98. Laycock, supra note 27, at 320 ("State boundaries do what ordinary citizens think they 
do: divide the authority of separate sovereigns."). 
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suggests that the relevant community, according to our social prac-
tices, is the territorial community rather than the community of 
origin. 
Equally important, the argument that my community has a right 
to define itself by limits on my behavior is balanced by the fact that I 
am a member of two communities. Under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, my birth within national boundaries constitutes me a citizen of 
the United States at the same time that my residence in Pennsylvania 
entitles me to citizenship in that state, whether or not Pennsylvania 
desires me as a member of its community. If the state of Pennsylvania 
has sought to define itself (and me) by its local prohibitions, the 
United States has equally defined itself (and me) by my entitlement to 
travel to California and interact with local residents on a basis of 
equality. 
In the American polity that has emerged since the Civil War, the 
Fourteenth Amendment established the primacy of national citizen-
ship, and the second Reconstruction sealed the primacy of national 
standards. Where a conflict arises between local and national identi-
ties, the local must recede. A claim that Pennsylvania is entitled to 
prohibit me from committing treason to its ideals by adhering to the 
visions of other states during visits to their territories is more than 
counterbalanced by my identity as a national citizen with the right to 
engage in such experimentation. Our social practice, after all, is not to 
impel our children to pledge allegiance to the flag of Pennsylvania, but 
to that of the United States. 
2. The Necessity of Order 
A rejection of consent and its cousins as a basis for political obedi-
ence does not necessarily leave such an obligation ungrounded, even in 
the absence of communitarian claims. David Hume articulated the 
classic objections to Lockean justifications of political obligation based 
on consent theory. He nonetheless articulated a powerful case for that 
obligation based on the necessity of the convention of obedience to law 
as the mechanism to preserve society against chaos: 
men could not live at all in society ... without laws and magistrates and 
judges to prevent the encroachments of the strong upon the weak, of the 
violent upon the just and equitable. . . . If the reason be asked of that 
obedience which we are bound to pay to government, I readily answer, 
because society could not otherwise subsist . . . . 99 
99. HUME, supra note 74, at 368. See generally id. at 360-68; DAVID HUME, Treatise on 
Human Nature, in HUME'S MORAL AND PoLmCAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 74, at 1, 114 
("When men have once experienced the impossibility of preserving any steady order in society, 
while every one is his own master •.. they naturally run into the invention of government •.•• 
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Hume's approach provides a perfectly adequate basis for demand-
ing obedience to the law of those present within the state's boundaries, 
or those who act extraterritorially with injurious domestic conse-
quences.100 However, this justification of a state's legal authority as a 
necessary protective and coordinating mechanism does not support 
the claim that states can exercise extraterritorial authority over citi-
zens by virtue of their citizenship. When I visit California, my actions, 
whatever they may be, do not threaten the public order of Penn-
sylvania any more than the actions of Californians do. My status as a 
Pennsylvanian gives my home state no special consequentialist claim 
to control my actions. Nor is Pennsylvania's intervention necessary to 
prevent circumstances in California from degenerating into a state of 
"civil war, insurrection, and violence";101 obedience to the law of Cali-
fornia avoids that possibility. Finally, my sense of mutual obligation 
within Pennsylvania is not undercut by my freedom in California. I 
do not feel myself to be "the cully of my integrity" for obeying Penn-
sylvania's law when I am at home; all others are likewise bound. 
These notions of right and obligation are derived from nothing but the advantage we reap from 
government ..•• "); id. at 104 ("We shall quickly perceive how fruitless it is ... [to] seek in the 
laws of nature a stronger foundation for our political duties than interest and human conven-
tions"); id. at 105 (''To obey the civil magistrate is requisite to preserve order and concord in 
society."). 
The problem as Hume conceived it was what we would today call a prisoner's dilemma: 
[People] prefer any trivial advantage that is present to the maintenance of order in society, 
which so much depends on the observance of justice. The consequences of every breach of 
equity seem to lie very remote, and are not liable to counterbalance any immediate advan-
tage that may be reaped from it ...• [A]s all men are in some degree subject to the same 
weakness, it necessarily happens that the violations of equity must become very frequent in 
society, and the commerce of men by that means be rendered very dangerous and uncer-
tain ...• Your example both pushes me forward in this way by imitation, and also affords me 
a new reason for any breach of equity by showing me that I should be the cully of my 
integrity if I alone should impose on myself a severe restraint amidst the licentiousness of 
others. 
Id. at 98. 
The Humean consequentialist argument is approvingly rehearsed in HERZOG, WITHOUT 
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 75, at 180-89; cf. KLosKo, supra note 73, at 93-94 (setting forth 
Humean argument but suggesting that it is vulnerable to general objections to utilitarianism). 
100. Cf. Douglas Laycock, Equality and the Citizens of Sister States, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 
431, 447 (1987) ("People create governments and endow them with coercive power out of neces-
sity - to preserve life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. • • . Coercive government power 
must bind everyone within the jurisdiction . . . . [T]he power to coerce visitors [as well as citi-
zens] is ... derived from necessity. They must obey ... lest government fail in its essential 
purpose."). 
101. HERZOG, WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS, supra note 75, at 181; see DAVID HUME, Of Pas-
sive Obedience, in 1 EssAYS: MORAL, PoLmCAL AND LITERARY 460, 462 (f.H. Green & T.H. 
Grose eds., 1875); cf. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 272-73 (C.B. MacPherson ed. 1968) (1651) 
("The Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign, is understood to last as long, and no longer, than 
the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them .... [H]e that ... hath leave to travell, is 
still Subject; but it is, by Contract between Soveraigns, not by vertue of the covenant of Subjec-
tion. For whosoever entreth into anothers dominion, is Subject to all the Lawes thereof; unlesse 
he have a privilege by the amity of the Soveraigns .... "). 
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"Anarchism," Professor Brilmayer has earlier commented in treat-
ing these problems, "does not have a promising future as a basis for 
judicial decision making in choice of law cases."102 But a dread of 
anarchy, while providing a solid foundation for imposing obligations 
within a state's boundaries, does not have much of a future as a basis 
for generating a duty of allegiance when citizens travel abroad. 
CONCLUSION 
With luck the immediate subject of these arguments will remain 
academic. There is at least a plausible scenario under which congres-
sional intervention will provide uniform federal protection for abor-
tion rights in the United States. We can, however, expect the general 
problem of moral dissensus in a federal republic to recur in other do-
mains of contested morality, from traditional issues of sexual conduct 
to the frontiers of biotechnology.103 In cases of such dissensus, both 
constitutional structure and political theory undergird the proposition 
that American citizens do not carry the morality of their home states 
with them as they travel, like fleeing convicts dragging the shackles of 
their imprisonment. Rather, citizens who reside in each of the states 
of the Union have the right to travel to any of the other states in order 
to follow their consciences, and they are entitled to •do so within the 
frameworks of law and morality that those sister states provide. 
102. Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness and Choice of Law, supra note 64, at 1298. 
103. Cf. In re Busalacchi, No. 59,582, 1991 WL 10048, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 1991) 
(order prohibiting guardian from transferring ward who was in persistent vegetative state to 
Minnesota hospital because of perception that he was doing so to avoid Missouri's law on the 
right to die); Susan F. Appleton, Surrogacy Arrangements and the Conflict of Laws, 1990 Wis. L. 
REv. 399, 444-52 (concluding that prosecution of surrogate mothers for contracting for surro-
gacy outside of the state would be unconstitutional). 
